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ABSTRACT: The classic analytic tradition associated the philosophy of George Berkeley 
with idealism. Yet in terms of the German Idealismus, Berkeley was no idealist. Rather, he 
described himself as an “immaterialist”. In the classic analytic tradition we find a misunderstanding 
of the German Idealismus. This paper will suggest, through reference to the work of Paul Redding, 
that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents Idealismus as that which reconciles objectivity and 
subjectivity in the experience of consciousness. Hegel’s Phenomenology develops this idea in the 
elaboration of a remarkably novel theory of consciousness. For Hegel, the conditions of the 
possibility of the objects of experience are a dialectical movement between consciousness and the 
object, or immediacy and mediacy. In the whole movement of consciousness we have the logic of 
contradiction working at the back of phenomenological experience that Hegel will make explicit in 
the Science of Logic, a logic that involves the thinker becoming consciously aware of their own 
thought processes. Yet Hegel’s Logic is different from the common meaning of ‘logic’. His Logic 
is not a formal approach to valid inference but captures the method and the moments and movement 
of logic. For Hegel, the great problem of classical logic is the immobility of the categories. This 
paper proposes that Hegel’s ‘holism’ entails the description wherein Logic, Nature, and Spirit are 
articulated as a whole in dialectical movement.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we will follow Paul Redding in his Hegelian overview beginning with 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, continuing with the Science of Logic and ending with the 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Redding provides us with an important holistic 
approach that articulates the method of Hegel’s thought with his logical mediation and the 
transition to Realphilosophy. We suggest that Redding’s exposition picks up the correct 
movement of the Hegelian Idea, which is the Idea in movement throughout the conceptual 
content. Our aim is to present Redding’s works3 and to stress some ideas and issues that he 
presents from the standpoint of analytic philosophy.  
Firstly, we need to understand what Idealismus is for Hegel. The classic analytic 
tradition associated the philosophy of George Berkeley with idealism. Yet in the German 
Idealismus, Berkeley was no idealist. Rather, he described himself as an “immaterialist”. In 
the classic analytic tradition we find a misunderstanding of the German Idealismus. For the 
“German tradition Idee (plural, Ideen) did not refer to the sort of subjective mental 
representations that Berkeley, in common with the British empiricists, called ‘ideas’ (for 
this notion, the Germans reserved the term Vorstellung, usually translated as 
‘representation’)” (id. p. 3)4. In the German tradition, ideas are also not “forms” as Platonic 
entities in any enclosed mental sphere.  
The concept of German Idealismus requires the unification of the modern 
subjective conception of consciousness, the “mechanical” worldview, and Greek 
speculative thought. “For Hegel, in particular, this came to take an historical dimension in 
which Greek speculative philosophy could be seen as set on a trajectory in which the 
modern conception of an atomic subject standing opposed to its ‘object’ was somehow 
generated from the matrix of ancient thought, bringing about both the freedom and 
alienation that characterized modern life” (id. p. 3-4). This is the challenge for Hegel: to 
reconcile modern subjectivity with ancient objectivity. In other words, “for Hegel, the task 
facing moderns was that of somehow bringing about a reconciliation of the alienated 
modern subject with the world without sacrificing its unique form of freedom” (id. p. 4). 
                                                            
3 Paul Redding. “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel”. Oxford Companion to 19th Century German Philosophy, 
ed M. Forster and K. Gjesdal, forthcoming 2013; and Paul Redding. “Hegel’s Anticipation of the Early 
History of Analytic Philosophy”. The Owl of Minerva. 42 (1–2):18–40 (2010-11). 
4 Paul Redding. “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel”. Oxford Companion to 19th Century German Philosophy, 
ed M. Forster and K. Gjesdal, 2013.  
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Phenomenology of Spirit is the presentation of this true Idealismus that reconciles 
objectivity and subjectivity in the experience of consciousness.  
 
2. Phenomenology: Analytic Philosophy and Logic Model 
In the following sections our aim is to identify the specific moments of the 
movement of Hegel's logic. We will break down each moment and explain its significance, 
exploring each moment under a separate heading.  
a. Phenomenology and early analytic philosophy5 
Redding reminds us that “Kant had thought of objects of experience as necessarily 
having conceptual (as well as spatio-temporal) form, but non-conceptual (‘intuitional’) 
content” (Redding, 2010-11, p. 19). In contrast, Hegel elaborates a new model of 
experience of consciousness. The conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience 
(see Kant) are in Hegel as a dialectical movement between consciousness and the object, or 
immediacy and mediacy: “When we reflect on this difference, we find that neither one nor 
the other is only immediately present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time 
mediated: I have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing” (Hegel, 1977, p. 59 
6). This movement constitutes the content of the object, “because of the constitutive 
contradiction at its centre” (Redding, 2010-11, p. 20). The immediate shape of 
consciousness is “sense-certainty” and “the objects of sense-certainty show clear parallels 
with the sense-data of Bertrand Russell’s early philosophy” (id. p. 20). Hegel appeals to the 
model of the demonstrative pronoun, “this” – “I am in it only as a pure ‘This’, and the 
object similarly only as a pure ‘This’ (Hegel, 1977, p. 58) – in order to capture the 
immediacy of the contents of sense-certainty. “Russell too appeals to demonstratives as the 
proper names of sense data (...) then allows us to think of Hegel as, in some way, 
anticipating Wilfrid Sellars’s celebrated critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’ ” (id. p. 20).  
We have different interpretations of the Phenomenology’s opening chapters 7, for 
example, Kenneth Westphal, in Hegel’s Epistemology: a Philosophical Introduction to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, 2003, takes the contemporary analytical epistemological 
                                                            
5 Paul Redding. “Hegel’s Anticipation of the Early History of Analytic Philosophy”. The Owl of Minerva. 42 
(1–2):18–40 (2010-11). 
6 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. 
7  See  Robert B. Pippin. Hegel's idealism: The satisfactions of self-consciousness. Cambridge University 
Press, 1989. Terry Pinkard. Hegel's phenomenology: the sociality of reason. Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
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approach. Redding explores the relationship between Hegel and analytic philosophy, 
particularly semantics and the nature of reference. He agrees with Westphal’s 
epistemological reading and thinks that the parallels with analytic theories of reference are 
illuminating. Henry Harris, in Hegel’s Ladder: the pilgrimage of Reason, 1997, qualifies 
“sense-certainty” as pre-philosophical in everyday life. He compares consciousness like a 
countrywoman who is at home in her world of singular things and their proper names, to 
which we can unproblematically refer. “In Hegel’s dialectic, upon reflection consciousness 
comes to recognize its initial conception of what is given to it as problematic (...). 
Similarly, the conception of language as names to be attached to things is also problematic. 
[S]uch ideas seem to play a large role in the history of early analytic philosophy (...) the 
progress of these two ‘dialectics’ may show similarities” (id. p. 21). 
Experience, Language and Reference: Consciousness progresses through a series of 
shapes in the opening chapters of the Phenomenology. “The history of early analytic 
conceptions of reference might also be thought (...) the properly referring parts of speech 
which express thought” (id. p. 21). In Hegel a simple experiment involves the use of 
language, for example, there are singular references of words like “this”, “now”, “here”. He 
interprets that what “I mean” or “my opinion” cannot be what is said, or written down, 
because the “absolutely singular, wholly personal, individual things” cannot be expressed. 
“The semantic contents of words such as ‘this’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are properly thought of 
not as names but as universals, words expressing concepts, and it is this fact that is made 
explicit in ‘perception’ ”(id. p. 22).  
The contradictory “Thing” of Perception: The object of perception is different from 
the object of sense-certainty. Hegel describes this object as a “Thing” (das Ding) 
articulated with many properties. He gives as the example, “this salt” that is constituted of 
properties such as: white, tart, cubical etc. These properties are different and relate to 
others as their opposites; finally they inhere in a “one” that excludes other ones. Aristotle in 
the Categories also conceived the “Thing” of perception that endures and remains in this 
change. For Aristotle the “Thing” of perception is a substance with a tensional concept, 
either universal or particular. For Hegel the “Thing” of perception also has a complex or a 
contradictory concept in the experience of consciousness.  
When we replace the proper name with a description there is a parallel between 
consciousness in Hegel’s presentation and the semantic assumptions of the early analytic 
philosophy we find in Russell. “But the descriptivist analysis of perceptual content in 
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Hegel’s account fails, as does the descriptivist analysis of proper names in Russell’s 
account, and both these failures are bound up with internal problems with the Aristotelian 
infrastructure of this thought” (id. p. 24). 
From Perception to Understanding or from Russell to Quine: The transition from 
perception to understanding “involves a form of cognition that employs concepts whose 
contents are no longer determined by sensuously given properties” (id. p. 29). Redding 
refers to Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, 1827, in the discussion of 
“representation”, wherein Hegel describes the content of representation as “given” and 
immediately found. The transition from “a sensible, immediate givenness” to determined 
content, “it is only in thought that concepts function in a way such that they are no longer 
determined by some given sensuous content” (id. p. 29). Redding suggests that a model for 
this is to be found in Leibniz’s critique of Locke’s “Myth of the Given”. Leibniz criticizes 
the Lockean conception of “clear and distinct ideas”, but for Leibniz they are “clear and 
confused”, because we need to employ analytic methods, a technique which Leibniz had 
called “analysis” (see p. 29).  
In the chapter, “Force and the Understanding”, Hegel describes the “play of forces” 
that stands in opposition to each other, the “absolute interchange” of forces. This is the 
difference in contrast to perception wherein the world is a static world of things. Now is 
stressed the movement of contradiction of the play of forces, surpassing the principle of 
identity and the atomistic assumptions, into the relation between opposed forces. “The 
discussion of the play of forces has brought out the error behind the atomistic assumptions 
with which consciousness has been operating, the assumptions that an object’s identity can 
be conceived in abstraction from its relations” (id. p. 30).   
Redding has presented the Hegelian semantic equivalent of understanding’s 
“object” in the early history of analytic philosophy. He suggests that “a novel way around 
the problem of “the Given” had been put forward by W. V. O. Quine” (id. p. 30). In this 
sense “Quine introduces the ‘semantic holism’ that Russell had originally reacted against in 
his idealist predecessors, and this is part of the reason behind Richard Rorty’s claim of the 
‘re-Hegelianizing’ of analytic philosophy” (id. p. 31). Quinean’s  holism “has been an 
important contributor to what I [Redding] have referred to elsewhere as the ‘return of 
Hegelian thought’ within analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century” (id. p. 
32).   
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b. The Model and the Logic of the Consciousness in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit  
Phenomenology, according to the text’s original title, is a “science of the experience 
of consciousness”. However, what is the model of consciousness that Hegel proposes to 
describe in the path of the Absolute Knowing? It is neither the Cartesian identification of 
thinking and consciousness nor Reinhold’s fixed separation between the individual thinker 
(the subject) and the “object” of which that subject is conscious. Hegel wants to surpass 
this model subject-object. There are other models such as the model of self-knowledge 
wherein the subject/object are identical; or a type of collective thinking, undertaken by a 
community in which the unity of the ‘thinking subject’ is distributed over a plurality of 
different subjects; or a type closer to a religious conception of some sort of ‘participation’ 
of the individual conscious subject in the mind of a God (cf. id p. 5) 8. All of these models 
and dimensions of consciousness play a role in Hegel’s alternative to the simple subject-
object model, says Redding.  
 Experience of contradiction of consciousness: There is normative shape or 
logical movement working in the back of the consciousness in order to supersede the 
contradiction subject-object and instantiate the reconciliation of the experience of 
consciousness.  According to Redding, while Hegel’s interpretation of phenomenology “is 
a highly innovative one, we might think of the basic conception behind his idea as a 
Kantian one” (id. p. 6). 
Kant thinks that empirical knowledge is conditioned by structures of the individual 
knower that are both intuitional and conceptual. For this reason the object cannot be 
thought of as it is “in itself”, and that is why we don’t know the world “as it is in itself”. 
“This project of traditional metaphysics was then to be replaced by a type of self-
knowledge – knowledge by the thinker of its own constitutive conditions as a thinker” (id. 
p. 6).  
In each step of the experience of consciousness, Hegel resolves the contradictions 
that Kant alludes to but did not recognize were reconcilable. Hegel presents the 
contradiction that is the implicit logic in the experience of consciousness and by the 
                                                            
8  Paul Redding. “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel”. Oxford Companion to 19th Century German Philosophy, 
ed M. Forster and K. Gjesdal, 2013.  
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dialectical movement it becomes the explicit shape of consciousness in the extended way 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Contradiction in the consciousness as sense-certainty: In Chapter 1, consciousness 
struggles “to make its implicit criteria for objecthood explicit to itself by making them in 
turn objects of consciousness has resulted in contradiction”. The contradiction here is this: 
The immediate singular object is opposed to the universal. “When I say: ‘a single thing’, I 
am really saying what is from a wholly universal point of view, for everything is a single 
thing”9. As a result, instead of being “this”, “now”, “here”, the object will be the “thing”.  
Contradiction in the consciousness as perception: The object of “perception” is 
conceived as thing: “This determinateness, which constitutes the essential character of the 
Thing and distinguishes it from all others, is now defined in such a way that the Thing is 
thereby in opposition to other Things, but is supposed to preserve its independence in this 
opposition” (Hegel, ¶ 125, p. 75). This opposition collapses this experience and the new 
shape emerges from the perception. 
Contradiction in the consciousness as understanding: This experience grasps the 
contradictions as a play of forces. “This true essence of Things has now the character of not 
being immediately for consciousness; on the contrary, consciousness has a mediated 
relation to the inner being and, as the Understanding, looks through this mediating play of 
Forces into the true background of Things. The middle term which unites the two 
extremes, the Understanding and the inner world is the developed being of Force” (Hegel, ¶ 
143, p. 86-7).  
After this experience, Chapter 4 realizes the change to self-consciousness, that is 
“something like a transition from all pre-Kantian conceptions of the objects of philosophy 
to a Kantian one, or, more specifically, to the form of transformed Kantianism found in the 
work of Fichte” (Redding, id. p. 7). We have here the “struggle of recognition” between 
two self-consciousnesses, a struggle that reveals the contradiction by the asymmetry of its 
instantiation in the form of the master and slave.  
The dialectic method characterizes these experiences that progress to reason 
(Chapter 5), spirit (Chapter 6), religion (Chapter 7) and Absolute Knowing (Chapter 8). An 
immanent and implicit logic works during all the movements and moments of the 
                                                            
9 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, ¶ 
110, p. 66. 
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consciousness. The Absolute Knowing is the whole in movement, in other words, what was 
implicit now becomes explicit because “the True is the whole. But the whole is nothing 
other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it 
must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is” (Hegel, 
Preface, ¶ 20, p. 11).  
We have in the whole movement of consciousness the logic of contradiction 
working at the back of phenomenological experience that the Science of Logic will make 
explicit: “the thinker becomes consciously aware of its own thought processes” (id. p. 8).  
 
3. The Method of the Science of Logic  
The meaning of “logic” today is different to Hegel’s Logic. “Hegel did not have in 
mind that type of formal approach to valid inference that we now think of as the subject 
matter of logic” (Redding, p. 8). In his logic it is important to grasp the method and the 
movement of logic. The great problem from classical logic was the immobility of the 
categories, that is, the non-movement of whole categories. Hegel begins with this kind of 
thought that qualifies as (a) the logic of “understanding”. But this is only one moment of 
the movement of the logical method that needs to develop two other moments: (b) the 
negativity of dialectic which brings the fixed determination of the understanding into 
contradiction and (c) the positivity of speculation which “apprehends the unity of the 
determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and 
in their transition”10. “It is only these three interconnected dimensions of ‘logic’ that gives 
life to thought” (id. p. 9), concludes Redding. The Science of Logic is a network of 
concepts that are in relationship to each other by the method of the whole in movement. 
We point out in the Science of Logic aspects of these different moments of the 
implementation of the Hegelian method.  
1 - In the first chapter of Book 1, “Being”, Hegel describes the “know how” of his 
logical method with the dialectic between: Being-Nothing-Becoming. He commences with 
Being because it is the “immediate”. Being does not have presuppositions or 
determinations. However, the movement of determination of thought needs the opposition 
to something else, that is, “Nothing”. Now it commences the relation between Being-
                                                            
10 G. W. F. Hegel. The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the 
Zusätze, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991, § 82.  
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Nothing that is the mediation. It apprehends the unity of their opposition by the category 
“Becoming”. This moment is a more inclusive determination than the bare Being. The “cell 
matrix” of the whole logic as described here, that is, the relation between immediacy-
mediation, involves movement. The first concept leaves and returns from the other by the 
dialectic movement as a new conceptual content always open for “another more inclusive 
determination that is now affirmed” (id. p. 9).    
2 - In Book 2, “The Doctrine of Essence”, Hegel describes the dialectic of 
“essence” and “appearance”. Redding compares this moment with the “play of forces” 
from the Phenomenology of Spirit. In other words, it refers to the whole relation of thought 
through the structures of reflexion. Now the object of logic becomes translucent by the 
“play of reflexion” between “essence” and “appearance”, instantiating the relation of 
determinate negation (cf. id. p. 9).  
3 - In Book 3, “The Doctrine of Concept”, Hegel introduces the debate about formal 
logic in Chapters 2 (“The Judgement”) and 3 (“The Syllogism”). First, what does 
“concept” mean for Hegel? It is not “the type of empirical conceptual representation 
applied in a judgement”. Hegel’s model for “concept” is the idea “that Kant thought as 
ultimately presupposed by the application of any empirical concept – the concept ‘I’ (id. p. 
10). Redding examines the concept “I” in relation to the theme of the “struggle for 
recognition” in the Phenomenology of Spirit: the “I” emerges from two self-
consciousnesses that will later be constituted by other moments of the developments of 
spirit. “Possession of the concept ‘I’ will thereby be dependent on the possession of many 
other concepts (....). Thus “I” will be no self-sufficient atomic concept; it must ultimately 
be conceptually related to many other concepts, and Hegel purports to unpack this implicit 
content via an examination of the way concepts function in judgments and syllogisms” (id. 
p. 10) 11.  
This structural web of concept involves three moments: Universal, Particular and 
Singular. Kant opposed the general concepts with singularity, thus he needs the intuitive 
contents in order to make concepts determinate. Hegel also recognizes that the universal 
concepts are indeterminate, which is the reason that they need to become determinate. To 
achieve determinacy it is not necessary to add something non-conceptual as Kant 
elaborated. Rather, Hegel introduces particularity: “a ‘particular’ is to be grasped in terms 
                                                            
11 See Robert Brandom. Articulating reasons: An introduction to inferentialism. Harvard University Press, 
2009. 
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of the genus-concept specifying the kind instantiated, and is to be distinguished from 
something singular” (id. p. 10). This is important to understand for Hegel’s account of 
judgments and inferences. In Chapter 2, Hegel presents two different approaches to the 
logical structure of judgment: (a) Subject and predicate terms are “considered complete, 
each on its own account, apart from the other”12; and (b) Subject and predicate terms 
receive their determination “in the judgment first”13. The first structure reflects the 
“approach of traditional term logics like that of Aristotle”, while with the second one 
shows that “the components of the judgment are treated in terms of their contribution to 
what is usually thought of as their propositional content” (id. p. 11).   
 For Hegel the syllogism is the truth of the judgment, “a claim that might be read in 
terms of an ‘inferentialist’ account of judgment content” (id. p. 11). He assumes the 
classical logic from Aristotle that affirms the subject term as itself a predicate, such that “S 
is P”. But he changes this form by using “S” and “P”, following Leibniz. Then, “treating 
this relation between subject and predicate as a type of identity – S=P – Hegel transforms 
the traditional syllogism of being into the “syllogism of reflection”. “This change in 
attitude to judgments and syllogisms reflect deep metaphysical differences between ancient 
and modern thought” (id. p. 11). According to Redding, “it is clear that for Hegel, 
Leibniz’s logic, which he treats at the point of transition between these two syllogistic 
forms, actualizes the dialectical self-undermining potential that is implicit in Aristotle’s 
whole logical project” (id. p. 11).  
Hegel shows that the “I” from which the determinations of subjective logic are 
posited by a subject, needs now to be itself “the product of an objective historically 
developed form of life” (id. p. 13). The subjective Logic describes the historical 
development of formal logic from Aristotle to Leibniz. Hegel presented this formal logic as 
ossified material of thought that needs to become fluid material in order to regain the 
fluidity of the concept. The “I” from “Subjectivity” was determined as “judgment” and 
“syllogism”. Now this process is developed through the world “such that elements of the 
world can be understood as configurations of thought’s articulations” (id. p. 13). Section 
Two, “Objectivity”  and Section Three, “The Idea” “must be read as attempting to exhibit 
the ‘content’ able to function as objective conditions for this very type of thought” (id p. 
13). That is the logical structure of a series of forms: mechanical, chemical and organic 
                                                            
12 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller, London: Allen and Unwin, 1969, p. 625.  
13 Id. p. 627.  
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processes which will constitute the “real-philosophy” (Philosophy of Nature). And the 
“Idea” is the logical structure realized in the Philosophy of Spirit. This whole process is the 
return to the objectivity of Logic and the transition to Realphilosophy. 
 
4. Hegel’s Holism or the Systematic Real Philosophy 
Hegelian holism is the description wherein Logic, Nature and Spirit are articulated 
as a whole in a dialectic movement. The Logic was described above and we must present 
the other two moments of the philosophical syllogism.  
a) Philosophy of Nature forms part of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences together with Logic and Philosophy of Spirit. The Philosophy of Nature contains 
the “presentation of the state of the natural sciences in Hegel’s time [that] is generally 
thought to have little more than historical interest” (id. p. 14). Redding shows us one aspect 
of the philosophy of nature by referring to the objection made by the philosopher W. T. 
Krug. Krug argues that Hegel attempts to “deduce” the natural world only from logical 
considerations before empirical science. He affirms that such idealism must deduce from 
the idea of “the Absolute”, all contingent phenomena, including the actual pen with which 
he was writing his critique. Hegel responded that Krug made the critique from “the 
common understanding” that posits the Absolute on the same level with the finite, which 
would entail that the determinacies that are a topic of philosophical discussion belong to 
the philosophy of nature. However this does not include the pen of Mr. Krug. Redding 
summarises this question very well: “Rather than ‘deducing’ the entire content of empirical 
reality, philosophy of nature takes as its subject matter the results of the natural sciences 
and tries to find within these results the sorts of categorical structures deduced in the logic” 
(id. p. 14). For Hegel the question is to apprehend the speculative meaning of the natural 
sciences in his time, or the dialectic method that articulates the parts with the whole as the 
natural organism.    
b) Philosophy of Spirit consists in subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute 
spirit. 1) Subjective spirit begins with the more immediate anthropological determination 
that is the soul (Seele) as the “feeling soul”. After we have the phenomenological 
experience the consciousness knows its opposition as a contradiction subject-object in 
modern philosophy. Ultimately spirit is described as “psychology”, referring to the 
“rational dimension of the life of the mind” in its normative sense “rather than naturalistic 
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[life]” (id. p. 15). The soul in its immediacy is included in the whole dynamic of the 
normative mediation which is the condition to become objective spirit or institutional, 
social and historical organisations.   
c) Objective spirit describes the way that spirit is objectified in history which will 
be later called Philosophy of Right. It begins with “abstract right” wherein Hegel presents 
the way that liberty becomes exterior in the objects and the struggle of persons by 
mediation of a contract that is a form of recognition. Afterwards, he passes to the moment 
of “morality” “conceived more or less as an internalization of the external legal relations” 
(id. p. 16). Morality makes the mediation of subjective liberty that is the warrant for the 
constitution of citizenship in the moment of “ethicity” (Sittlichkeit). We have three 
institutions of liberty: the person, the subject and citizenship, which are articulated as 
spheres modelled on different “syllogistic” configurations. This syllogism of liberty is 
“Hegel’s ‘logical’ schematisation of the modern ‘rational’ state” (id. p. 16), articulating the 
three institutions of liberty in a holistic way. Ultimately, the “world history” (die 
Weltgeschichte) is the final part of objective spirit wherein Hegel presents the criterion of 
the peoples becoming a state enabled to relate internationally. It depends on the “degree to 
which they enable the development of a universalizable self-consciousness capable of 
rationality and freedom” (id. p. 17). It is important to observe that Hegel does not destroy 
the particular people in his holistic understanding of world history. Rather, he preserves, or 
better, guarantees the sphere of particular peoples within the syllogistic and holistic 
configuration of world history. Redding concludes this part with a special claim that 
responds to many prejudices about Hegel’s particular analysis of the history of peoples: “It 
must be stressed that, as with philosophy of nature, philosophy of history is not meant to 
somehow deduce actual empirical historical phenomena like Krug’s pen; rather, it takes the 
results of actual empirical history as its material and attempts to find exemplified within 
this material the sorts of categorical progressions of the logic” (id. p. 17). 
 d) Absolute Spirit comprehends three moments: art, religion and philosophy. 
The aesthetic experience is not the experience of the beauty of nature as in the Kantian 
conception, but for Hegel “aesthetics is primarily about art, and the art of historical peoples 
is understood in terms (...) to bring before consciousness the totality of what is” (id. p. 18), 
the shape of the Absolute is intuited in “symbolic art” (pantheistic religions), in “classical 
art” (Greek and Roman), and in “romantic art”. The latter “is characterized by the depth of 
a form of subjective consciousness that is largely missing in antiquity” (id. p. 18). This 
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shift introduces the moment of religion that grasps the Absolute as “representation” 
(Vorstellung) that is the form of God in the Trinitarian Christian Religion. Finally, the 
transition to philosophy is the moment that grasps the Absolute as the concept. It means to 
apprehend the three forms of Absolute in the immediate form as intuition, later by 
mediation of representation, and finally as the holistic concept itself.  
The issue about religion divided the Hegelian followers into “left” and “right”. 
They questioned “whether Hegel was signalling the overcoming of religion by a 
fundamentally secular philosophy, or a transition to some higher, more rational form of 
religion” (id. p. 20). According to Redding, “Hegel identified himself as a Christian (...) 
without this element we have only the dead ossifications of reason, rather than reason itself, 
and the inability to conceptually distinguish the realms of nature and spirit” (id. p. 20). 
Redding assists us to see the unity of the Hegelian system, beginning with the 
implicit logic of the Phenomenology, the explicit logic of the Science of Logic, and moving 
on to his holistic account of Logic, Nature and Spirit in his Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences. We have tried to show that Redding’s account of Hegel’s 
philosophical trajectory clarifies Hegel’s novel approach to logic, to wit, that logic consists 
in grasping the method and movement of the implicit logic of thought. Classical logic held 
the categories to be immobile, static, and Hegel’s holism puts ancient logic into motion by 
describing the movement wherein Logic, nature, and Spirit as a whole in dialectical 
movement. Hegel’s Idealismus sets before philosophy a radically new challenge: 
reconciling objectivity and subjectivity in the experience of consciousness. 
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